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Abstract
Recent tremendous development of quantum information theory
led to a number of quantum technological projects, e.g., quantum
random generators. This development stimulates a new wave of in-
terest in quantum foundations. One of the most intriguing problems
of quantum foundations is elaboration of a consistent and commonly
accepted interpretation of quantum state. Closely related problem is
clarification of the notion of quantum randomness and its interrela-
tion with classical randomness. In this short review we shall discuss
basics of classical theory of randomness (which by itself is very com-
plex and characterized by diversity of approaches) and compare it
with irreducible quantum randomness. The second part of this review
is devoted to the information interpretation of quantum mechanics
(QM) in the spirit of Zeilinger and Brukner (and QBism of Fuchs et
al.) and physics in general (e.g., Wheeler’s “it from bit”) as well as
digital philosophy of Chaitin (with historical coupling to ideas of Leib-
nitz). Finally, we continue discussion on interrelation of quantum and
classical randomness and information interpretation of QM.
1 Introduction
Recently the interest to quantum foundations was rekindled by the rapid and
successful development of quantum information theory. One of the promising
quantum information projects which can lead to real technological applica-
tions is the project on quantum random generators. Successful realization of
this project attracted attention of the quantum community to the old and
complicated problem of interrelation of quantum and classical randomness.
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In this short review we shall discuss this interrelation: classical random-
ness.1 versus irreducible quantum randomness2 This review can be useful
for researchers working in quantum information theory, both as a review on
classical randomness and on interpretational problems of QM related to the
notion of randomness.
We emphasize the coupling between information and randomness, both in
the classical and quantum frameworks. This approach is very natural in the
light of modern information revolution in QM and physics in general. More-
over, “digital philosophy” (in the spirit of Chaitin) spreads widely in modern
science, i.e., not only in physics, but in, e.g., computer science, artifical in-
telligence, biology. Therefore it is natural to discuss jointly randomness and
information including novel possibilities to operate with quantum informa-
tion and randomness outside of physics, e.g., in biology (molecular biology,
genetics) and cognitive science and general theory of decision making [32],
[1], [2].
2 Random sequences: heuristics
We start by pointing out that one has to distinguish theories of probability
and randomness (although they are closely related). At the heuristic level the
difference between the notions of probability and randomness can be easily
explained. First consider the set Ω of all sequences of the length N composed
of zeros and ones, x = (x1, ..., xN ), xj = 0, 1. The uniform probability distri-
bution on Ω is defined as p(x) = 1/2N , x ∈ Ω. Thus all sequences are equally
probable. Suppose, for example, that in some experiment we obtained a
sequence of the form (spaces are added to make it more readable):
110010010000111111011010101000100010000101101000110000100011010011
0001001100011001100010100010111000000011011100000111001101000100
1010010000001001001110000010001000101001100111110011000111010000
0000100000101110111110101001100011101100010011100110110010001001
This sequence matches well our heuristics about randomness. To use it later,
we denote this sequence xrand. (Here N = 258.) Now suppose that we ob-
tained the sequence of the same length of the form x = 010101....01 (com-
posed of blocks 01). It is clear that it cannot be treated as a random sequence.
1As based on a variety of approaches: unpredictability (von Mises), complexity-
incompressibility (Kolmogorov, Solomonoff, Chaitin), typicality (Martin-Lo¨f).
2As based on acausality of quantum measurements (von Neumann) and information
principles (Zeilinger and Brukner [65], [9]- [12], [66], see also Kofler and Zeilinger [34]).
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Would this sequence appear in a random experiment, it would be strange and
unexpected. However, the probability to pick up both sequences from Ω is
the same. Thus the probability calculus cannot formalize our heuristic im-
age of randomness. Of course, it is clear why the second sequence is not
random. The repeatability of the appearance of zeros and onces is a defi-
nite signal of presence of some causal process producing this regular pattern.
But in general it is very difficult to understand whether there is some causal
process behind an observed sequence of zeros and ones. To illustrate this
problem, I specially took the “random sequence” xrand as the first 258 digits
in the binary expansion of the number π which can be computed algorithmi-
cally. Thus one cannot simply proceed heuristically. Some formal theory of
randomness and its interrelation with probability has to be developed.
We remark that consideration of infinite sequences cannot solve the prob-
lem of mismatching heuristics related to probability and randomness. The
space of infinite binary sequences Ω can also be endowed with the uniform
probability distribution. Sequences which look like random and sequences
which look like regular do have the same probability of appearance (in fact,
zero probability).
The problem of interrelation of the notions of probability and randomness
was discussed already by Laplace [41]:
“We arrange in our thought, all possible events in various classes; and we
regard as extraordinary those classes which include a very small number. In the
game of heads and tails, if heads comes up a hundred times in a row, then this
appears to us extraordinary, because the almost infinite number of combinations
that can arise in a hundred throws are divided in regular sequences, or those in
which we observe a rule that is easy to grasp, and in irregular sequences, that are
incomparably more numerous.”
Roughly speaking, Laplace tried to shift the problem of randomness from
individual sequences to classes (sets) of sequences. Although we cannot dis-
tinguish random and non-random sequences using probabilities of their in-
dividual appearance, we might try to estimate probability measures of some
classes of sequences. The set of regular sequences has a small measure; the
set of random sequences has an essentially larger measure. From this view-
point, random sequences are typical and regular are atypical. This viewpoint
to formalization of the notion of randomness led to definition of randomness
as typicality (Laplace-Ville–Lo¨f, see section 3.2).
Besides the typicality dimension of randomness Laplace also pointed to
the aforementioned presence of a causal process as preventing a sequence to
be random [41]:
“The regular combinations occur more rarely only because they are less numer-
ous. If we seek a cause whenever we perceive symmetry, it is not that we regard
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the symmetrical event as less possible than the others, but, since this event ought
to be the effect of a regular cause or that of chance, the first of these suppositions,
is more probable than the second. On a table, we see letters arranged in this
order: C o n s t a n t i n o p l e, and we judge that this arrangement is not the
result of chance, not because it is less possible than others, for if this word were
not employed in any language we would not suspect it came from any particular
cause, but this word being in use among us, it is incomparably more probable that
some person has thus arranged the aforesaid letters than this arrangement is due
to chance.”
This viewpoint led to formalization of the notion of an individual ran-
dom sequence through formalization of the notion of causal generation of a
sequence which culminated in the Kolmogorov algorithmic complexity ap-
proach to randomness, sections 4, 4.1.
3 Classical randomness
3.1 Approach of von Mises: randomness as unpre-
dictability
Von Mises (1919) theory was the first probability theory [57]-[59] based fun-
damentally on the principle of the statistical stabilization of frequencies. Al-
though this principle was heuristically used from the very beginning of prob-
abilistic studies, only von Mises tried to formalize it mathematically and to
establish it as one of the basic principles of probability theory. His theory is
based on the notion of a collective (random sequence).
Consider a random experiment S and denote by L = {α1, ..., αm} the set
of all possible results of this experiment3. The set L is said to be the label
set, or the set of attributes of the experiment S. We consider only finite sets
L. Let us consider N trials for this S and record the results, xj ∈ L. This
process generates a finite sample:
x = (x1, ..., xN}, xj ∈ L. (1)
A collective is an infinite idealization of this finite sample:
x = (x1, ..., xN , ...}, xj ∈ L, (2)
3R. von Mises did not consider probability theory as a purely mathematical theory.
He emphasized that this is a physical theory such as, e.g., hydrodynamics. Therefore his
starting point is a physical experiment which belongs to physics and not to mathematics.
He was criticized for mixing physics and mathematics. But he answered that there is no
way to proceed with probability as a purely mathematical entity.
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for which the following two von Mises principles are valid.
Principle 1 (statistical stabilization). This is the principle of the sta-
tistical stabilization of relative frequencies of each attribute α ∈ L of the
experiment S in the sequence (2). Take the frequencies νN(α; x) =
nN (α;x)
N
where νN(α; x) is the number of appearance of the attribute α in the first N
trials. By the principle of the statistical stabilization the frequency νN (α; x)
approaches a limit as N approaches infinity, for every label α ∈ L. This
limit Px(α) = limN→∞ νN(α; x) is called the probability of the attribute α
of the random experiment S. (Sometimes (when the collective is fixed) this
probability will be denoted simply as P (α).)
Principle 2 (randomness). Heuristically it is evident that we cannot
consider, for example, the sequence
x = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ...)
as the output of a random experiment. However, the principle of the statisti-
cal stabilization holds for x and Px(0) = Px(1) = 1/2. To consider sequences
(2) as objects of probability theory, we have to put an additional constraint
on them: The limits of relative frequencies have to be stable with respect to
a place selection (choice of a subsequence) in (2). In particular, x does not
satisfy this principle.
However, this very natural notion (randomness) was the hidden bomb
in the foundations of von Mises’ theory. The main problem was to define a
class of place selections which induces a fruitful theory. The main and very
natural restriction which was set by von Mises is that a place selection in
(2) cannot be based on the use of attributes of elements. For example, one
cannot consider a subsequence of (2) constructed by choosing elements with
the fixed label α ∈ L. Von Mises defined a place selection in the following
way [58], p.9:
PS “a subsequence has been derived by a place selection if the decision to
retain or reject the nth element of the original sequence depends on the number
n and on label values x1, ..., xn−1 of the n− 1 preceding elements, and not on the
label value of the nth element or any following element”.
Thus a place selection can be defined by a set of functions
f1, f2(x1), f3(x1, x2), f4(x1, x2, x3), ..., fn(x1, ..., xn−1), ... (3)
each function yielding the values 0 (rejecting the nth element) or 1 (retaining
the nth element). Since any place selection has to produce from an infinite
input sequence also an infinite output sequence, it has also to satisfy the
following restriction:
fn(x1, ..., xn−1) = 1 for infinitely many n. (4)
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Here are some examples of place selections:
• choose those xn for which n is prime;
• choose those xn which follow the word 01;
• toss a (different) coin; choose xn if the nth toss yields heads.
The first two selection procedures are law-like, the third selection is ran-
dom. It is clear that all of these three procedures are place selections: the
value of xn is not used in determining whether to choose xn.
The principle of randomness ensures that no strategy using a place se-
lection rule can select a subsequence with different odds (e.g., for gambling)
than a sequence that is selected by flipping a fair coin. Hence, the principle
can be called the law of excluded gambling strategy. We cite Feller [20], pp.
198, 199: “The painful experience of many gamblers have taught us the lesson
that no system of betting is successful in improving the gambler chances . . .The
importance of this statement was first recognized by von Mises, who introduced
the impossibility of a successful gambling system as a fundamental axiom.”
Let x = (xj) be a collective (random sequence) with the label set L =
{0, 1}, i.e., xj = 0, 1. Given a place selection, see (3), (4), let n1 be the least
n such that fn(x1, ..., xn−1) = 1, n2 is the next such n, etc. Then by the
principle of randomness:
∃ lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
xnk = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk = Px(1). (5)
We stress that von Mises did not solve the problem of the existence of col-
lectives.
Mises-Church collectives (random sequences). The simplest way
(at least from the mathematical viewpoint) is to proceed with special classes
of lawlike place selections. In particular, A. Church [16] proposed to consider
place selections (3), (4) in which the selection functions fn(x1, ..., xn−1) are
algorithmically computable. (We recall that fn is used to select or not the
nth element of a sequence x = (x1, ..., xn, ...). It is important to note that
the set of all Church-like place selections is countable, see, e.g., [29]. The
existence of Church’s collectives is a consequence of the general result of A.
Wald [62] which we formulate now.
Mises-Wald collectives (random sequences). Let p = (pj = P (αj))
be a probability distribution on the label set L = {α1, ..., αm}. Denote the set
of all possible sequences with elements from L by the symbol L∞. Let φ be a
place selection. For x ∈ L∞, the symbol φx is used to denote the subsequence
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of x obtained with the aid of this place selection. Let U be some family of
place selections. We set X(U ; p) = {x ∈ L∞ : ∀φ ∈ U limN→∞ νn(αj;φx) =
pj , j = 1, ..., m}, where as usual νN(α; y), α ∈ L, denotes the relative fre-
quency of the appearance of the label α among the first N elements of the
sequence y ∈ L∞.
Theorem 1. (Wald [62]). For any countable set U of place selections and
any probability distribution p on the label set L, the set of sequences X(U ; p)
has the cardinality of the continuum.
By Wald’s theorem for any countable set of place selections U the fre-
quency theory of probability can be developed at the mathematical level of
rigorousness. R. von Mises was completely satisfied by this situation (see
[59]).
Ville’s attack to von Mises theory
However, a new cloud appeared on the sky. This was the famous Ville’s
objection [60].
Theorem 2. (Ville). Let L = {0, 1} and let U = {φn} be a countable set
of place selections. Then there exists x ∈ L∞ such that
• for all n,
lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1
(φnx)j = 1/2;
• for all N,
N∑
j=1
(φnx)j ≥ 1/2.
Such a sequence x of zeros and ones is a collective with respect to U, x ∈
X(U ; 1/2), but seems to be far too regular to be called random. At the same
time from the measure-theoretic viewpoint the existence of such sequences
is not a problem. The set of such sequences has the Lebesgue measure zero.
(We recall that any sequence of zeros and ones can be identified with a
real number from the segment [0, 1]). Here we see the difference between
the treatment of randomness as unpredictability (a la von Mises) and as
typicality (see section 3.2 for the latter – theory of Martin-Lo¨f).
3.2 Laplace-Ville-Martin-Lo¨f: randomness as typical-
ity
Ville used Theorem 2 to argue that collectives in the sense of von Mises and
Wald do not necessarily satisfy all intuitively required properties of random-
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ness. J. Ville introduced [60] a new way of characterizing random sequences
(cf. with Laplace [41]), based on the following principle:
Ville’s Principle: A random sequence should satisfy all properties of
probability one.4
Each property is considered as determining a test of randomness. Ac-
cording to Ville [60], a sequence can be considered random if it passes all
possible tests for randomness.
However, this is impossible: we have to choose countably many of those
properties (otherwise the intersection of the uncountable family of sets of
probability 1 can have probability less than 1 or simply be nonmeasurable;
in the latter case the probability is not defined at all). Countable families of
properties (tests for randomness) can be selected in various ways. A random
sequence passing one countable sequence of tests can be rejected by another.
This brings ambiguity in the Ville approach to randomness as typicality (i.e.,
holding some property with probability one).
It must be underlined that the Ville principle is really completely foreign
to von Mises. For von Mises, a collective x ∈ L∞ induces a probability on the
set of labels L, not on the set of all sequences L∞. Hence, for von Mises (and
other scientists interpreting randomness as unpredictability in an individual
sequence), there is no connection between properties of probability one in
L∞ and properties of an individual collective.
Later (in 1970th) P. Martin-Lo¨f (motivated by the talk of A. N. Kol-
mogorov at the Moscow Probability Seminar) [42] solved the problem of
ambiguity of the Ville interpretation of randomness as typicality. He pro-
posed to consider recursive (algorithmic) properties of probability one, i.e.,
the properties which can be tested with the aid of algorithms. Such an
approach induces the fruitful theory of recursive (algorithmic) tests for ran-
domness (see, for example, [43], [44]). The key point of this “algorithmic
tests” approach to the notion of randomness is that it is possible to prove
that there exists the universal algorithmic test. A sequence is considered
random if it passes this universal test. Thus the class of typicality-random
sequences is well defined. Unfortunately, this universal test of randomness
cannot be constructed algorithmically (although by itself it is an algorithmic
process). Therefore, although we have the well defined class of Martin-Lo¨f
random sequences, we do not know what the universal test for such ran-
domness looks like. Hence, for a concrete sequence of trials we cannot check
algorithmically whether it is random or not – although we know that it is
possible to perform such algorithmic check.
4Of course, Ville’s approach matches Laplace viewpoint [41] on randomness as typical-
ity.
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4 Kolmogorov: Randomness as Complexity
It is well know that personally A. N. Kolmogorov was not satisfied by his own
measure-theoretic approach to probability (private communications of his
former students). He sympathized to the von Mises approach to probability
in which randomness was no less fundamental than probability. In 1960th
he turned again to the foundations of probability and randomness and tried
to find foundations of randomness by reducing this notion to the notion
of complexity, 1963 [35]-[38]. Thus in short the Kolmogorov approach can
be characterized as randomness as complexity. Another basic point of his
approach is that complexity of a sequence has to be checked algorithmically.
Let L = {0, 1}. Denote by L∗ the set of all finite sequences (words) in the
alphabet L.
Definition 1 (Kolmogorov). Let A be an arbitrary algorithm. The algo-
rithmic complexity of a word x with respect to A is KA(x) = min l(π), where
{π} are the programs which are able to realize the word x with the aid of A.
Here l(π) denotes the length of a program π. This definition depends on
the structure of the algorithm A. Later Kolmogorov proved the following
fundamental theorem:
Theorem 3. (Kolmogorov, Solomonoff)5 There exists an algorithm A0
(optimal algorithm) such that, for any algorithm A, there exists a constant
C > 0,
KA0(x) ≤ KA(x) + C. (6)
It has to be pointed out that optimal algorithm is not unique.
The complexity K(x) of the word x is by definition equal to the complex-
ity KA0(x) with respect to one fixed optimal algorithm A0.
The original idea of Kolmogorov [35]-[38] was that complexity K(x1:n) of
the initial segments x1:n of a random sequence x has to have the asymptotic
∼ n
K(x1:n) ∼ n, n→∞, (7)
5Kolmogorov published this result in 1965 [134]. In fact, the first proof was presented
in Solomonoff’s preprint [52] in 1960. However, practically nobody paid attention to this
work. Its importance was not recognized by the scientific community. When Kolmogorov
became aware of this work, he openly recognized the priority of Solomonoff. In fact, this
Kolmogorov’s recognition played the crucial role in advertising research of Solomonoff who
first became famous in Soviet Union and only later in Western countries. Kolmogorov’s
contribution to establishing this area of research was memorized in assigning the name
Kolmogorov complexity to the algorithmic complexity.This does not diminish the role of
the contribution of Solomonoff [52], [53] (and Chaitin [13]).
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i.e., we might not find a short code for x1:n.
However, this heuristically attractive idea was rejected as a consequence
of the objection of Martin-Lo¨f [44]. To discuss this objection and connec-
tion of the Kolmogorov complexity-randomness with Martin-Lo¨f typicality-
randomness, we proceed with conditional algorithmic complexity K(x;n), in-
stead of complexity K(x). Conditional complexity K(x;n) is defined as the
length of the minimal program π which produces the output x on the basis
of information that the length of the output x is equal to n.
Theorem 4. (Martin-Lo¨f) For every binary sequence x,
K(x1:n;n) < n− log2 n, (8)
for infinitely many n.
Hence, Kolmogorov random sequences, in the sense of the definition (7),
do not exist.
Another problem of the Kolmogorov approach to randomness as algorith-
mic complexity is that we “do not know” any optimal algorithm A0, i.e., the
Kolmogorov complexity is not algorithmically computable! However, the lat-
ter problem can be partially fixed, because there exist algorithmic methods
to estimate this complexity (from above and from below).
4.1 Kolmogorov-Chaitin Randomness
As we have seen, in its straightforward form the Kolmogorov algorithmic
complexity does not lead to a nontrivial notion of a random sequence. How-
ever, as it happens [13], a fruitful theory of individual random sequences is
very near, it is enough to slightly modify the notion of Kolmogorov complex-
ity.
First, we remark that the notion of algorithm can be formalized as a
partial computable (recursive) function A : L∗ → L∗ (here “partial” means
that in general such a function is defined only on some subset D = DA of
L∗). Thus Kolmogorov complexity of a word x ∈ L∗ with respect to A equals
the length of the shortest word π ∈ D such that A(π) = x : KA(x) = l(π). If
such π ∈ D does not exist, then KA(x) = +∞.
A prefix of a word x = x1 . . . xn is a x̂ = x1 . . . xm, where m ≤ n. A subset
D of L∗ is called prefix free if no word inD is a prefix of another member ofD.
A real world example of a prefix free set (over the alphabet of decimal digits)
is the set of country dialing codes in the international telephone system.
Definition 2. Let A be an arbitrary algorithm, a partial computable func-
tion, with prefix free domain of definition D. Algorithmic prefix free complex-
ity of a word x ∈ L∗ with respect to A equals to the length of the shortest
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word π ∈ D such that A(π) = x : K˜A(x) = l(π). If such π ∈ D does not
exist, then K˜A(x) = +∞.
Theorem 5. There exists an optimal prefix free algorithm (partial com-
putable function) A0 such that, for any prefix free algorithm A, there exists
a constant C > 0,
K˜A0(x) ≤ K˜A(x) + C. (9)
Prefix free complexity K˜(x) of the word x is (by definition) equal to the
complexity KA0(x) with respect to one fixed (for all considerations) optimal
prefix free algorithm A0.
Definition 3. A sequence x ∈ L∞, L = {0, 1} is called Kolmogorov-
Chaitin random if it is incompressible (no initial segment of x can be com-
pressed more than for a fixed finite number of bits) or in other words:
∃b > 0 : K˜(x1:n) ≥ n− b for all n. (10)
Equivalence of Kolmogorov-Chaitin and Martin-Lo¨f approaches
to randomness
At the first sight the Kolmogorov-Chaitin and Martin-Lo¨f approaches to
randomness differ crucially. The first one is about randomness of an individ-
ual sequence. There is no reference to other sequences; one is not interested
in how typical is this concrete sequence in an ensemble of all possible se-
quences. We can say that Kolmogorov-Chaitin randomness is determined
intrinsically and Martin-Lo¨f randomness is determined externally. Therefore
the following result is really surprising:
Theorem 6. (Schnorr [50]) A sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random if and only
if its Kolmogorov-Chaitin random.
Coupling between Kolmogorov-Chaitin, Martin-Lo¨f and Mises-
Wald-Church randomnesses
Theorem 7. (Invariance of randomness with respect to place selections)
Let x = (xj) be a Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Lo¨f) random sequence. Given
an algorithmically computable place selection, see (3), (4), let n1 be the least
n such that fn(x1, ..., xn−1) = 1, n2 be the next such n, etc. Then x = (xnk)
is also a Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Lo¨f) random sequence.
It is also possible to prove that any Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Lo¨f)
random sequence satisfies the principle of statistical stabilization, i.e., relative
frequencies tend to limits - probabilities. Finally, we obtain the following
important result providing a partial connection with von Mises’ notion of
collective (with Church’s flavor):
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Corollary 1. Any Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Lo¨f) random sequence
is also Mises-Wald-Church random.
Of course, the inverse is not correct: as was shown by Ville, there exist
Mises-Wald-Church random sequences which do not pass the basic statistical
tests.
In the community working on foundations of randomness the assertion
thatMartin-Lo¨f randomness or equivalently Kolmogorov-Chaitin randomness
captures the “true notion of randomness”’ conforming to our intuition is
sometimes called the Martin-Lo¨f-Chaitin thesis. (The Martin-Lo¨f-Chaitin
thesis, like the Church-Turing thesis for the definition of algorithm, is not
a mathematical proposition that can be proved or refuted.) Thus in this
community the problem of formalization of the intuitive notion of randomness
is considered to be solved. Personally I do not think so.
Of course, the realization of the Kolmogorov-Solomonoff-Chaitin pro-
gram on randomness as complexity-incompressibility was one of the most
important contributions to theory of randomness. Now we have a rigorous
mathematical theory of individual random sequences. In the same way the
Martin-Lo¨f theory of algorithmic statistical tests provides a rigorous math-
ematical description of randomness as typicality. This theory establishes
the solid theoretical foundation for the widely applicable method of test-
ing of (pseudo)random generators, including the NIST test. An output of
a (pseudo)random generator has to pass a block of algorithmically designed
tests to be “recognized” as a (pseudo)random sequence. Schnorr’s proof
that the Kolmogorov-Solomonoff-Chaitin and Martin-Lo¨f approaches match
perfectly can be considered as culmination of development of theory of ran-
domness in 20th century.
Starting with 1960th (and even earlier with the works of Turing) the
evolution of mathematical theory of randomness was closely connected to
the computer revolution. Development of the art of programming excited
people about the idea of algorithmic computability. In the light of this rev-
olution, it was fashionable to formulate the problem of randomness with
the aid of language of computability. However, nowadays when the use of
advanced computer programs became the everyday routine and people are
not blindfolded by the light of programming anymore, one can ask honestly
whether the whole project of the algorithmically based randomness was re-
ally so much justified. The dream about creation of computer-like artificial
intelligence evaporated. Mind seems not to be driven by computer programs.
R. Penrose [48] rightly pointed to the transcendental nature of human mind.
In this new context one can try to start a new project of formalization of
randomness which is not based on algorithmic computability.
The situation is worse for the approach originated by von Mises (while its
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importance was recognized already by Laplace) and based on the interpre-
tation of randomness as unpredictability. On one hand, the mathematically
rigorous formalization of von Mises notion of collective suffers of Ville’s objec-
tion. On the other hand, in the Kolmogorov-Solomonoff-Chaitin-Martin-Lo¨f
framework one can be only sure that a random sequence is unpredictable in
the sense of Mises-Church, but not vice versa.
We remark that randomness as unpredictability seems to be the most
important for applications. In principle, user is not interested explicitly in
complexity of an output of a (pseudo)random generator or whether this out-
put passes a block of algorithmic tests. (We remark that the sequence xrand
from section 2 composed of the digits of the number π passes the majority
of standard tests of randomness. A special test had to be developed, the
so-called π-test, in order to block usage of this sequence.) We are interested
only in a possibility to predict the output or, at least, to find some patterns
in it. However, as we have seen, the direct formalization of randomness-
unpredictability has not yet been created. The von Mises approach (or
something totally novel) still waits for its time to come. We remark (pri-
vate communication of A. Shiryaev) that Kolmogorov died with the hope
that in future a new and unexpected approach to the notion of randomness
will be elaborated. And, of course, mathematicians will continue to work on
this problem. However, it may happen that future attempts will never lead to
a mathematically acceptable notion of randomness. This was the final point
of my lectures given at IQOQI (Vienna) in May-June 2014. In the after-
talk discussion various opinion were presented; in particular, prof. Zeilinger
conjectured that such a painful process of elaboration of the mathematical
theory of randomness is simply a consequence of the methodological mis-
treatment of this notion. It might be that randomness is not mathematical,
but a physical notion. Thus one has to elaborate physical procedures guaran-
tying randomness of experimentally produced sequences and not simply try
to construct such procedures mathematically. In some sense Zeilinger’s pro-
posal is consonant with von Mises’ proposal: to find a collective, one simply
has to go to a casino. Zeilinger proposes to go to his quantum optics lab at
Boltzmanngasse 3.
5 Irreducible Quantum Randomness from Vi-
olation of Causality
In his fundamental monograph [56] von Neumann pointed out that quantum
randomness is individual, e.g., even an individual electron is intrinsically
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random, while classical randomness is related to variation of states in an
ensemble, i.e., it is reducible to such ensemble variations. In particular,
von Neumann remarked [56], pp. 301-302, that, for measurement of some
quantity R for an ensemble of systems (of any origin),
“it is not surprising that R does not have a sharp value ..., and that a pos-
itive dispersion exists. However, two different reasons for this behavior a priori
conceivable:
1. The individual systems S1, ..., SN of our ensemble can be in different states,
so that the ensemble [S1, ..., SN ] is defined by their relative frequencies. The fact
that we do not obtain sharp values for the physical quantities in this case is caused
by our lack of information: we do not know in which state we are measuring, and
therefore we cannot predict the results.
2. All individual systems S1, ..., SN are in the same state, but the laws of nature
are not causal. Then in the cause of the dispersion is not our lack of information,
but is nature itself, which has disregarded the principle of sufficient cause.”
Thus, for him, quantum randomness is statistical exhibition of violation
of causality, violation of the principle of sufficient cause. We now compare
this kind of randomness with classical interpretations of randomness, see
section ??:
1. unpredictability (von Mises),
2. complexity-incompressibility (Kolmogorov, Solomonoff, Chaitin),
3. typicality (Martin-Lo¨f).
We start with Kolmogorov algorithmic complexity. One can argue that
violation of the principle of sufficient cause has to imply impossibility of
nontrivial compression of information in a string of bits produced by mea-
surements of a quantum observable A for an ensemble of systems prepared in
the identical state ψ, - that is, impossibility to write a program which would
produce this sequence and be essentially shorter than the sequence. Really,
it is difficult to imagine how any type of algorithmic process (different from
simple output of the result of measurement) can be represented mathemati-
cally in the absence of the classical state representation which would encode
possible outputs of measurement.6 However, it is not easy to formalize this
kind of reasoning.
Thus if the principle of sufficient cause is really violated for quantum
systems and one can really connect its violation to impossibility to shorten
6For example, in classical statistical mechanics by determining (precisely) the state
of a particles, by the phase-space point (q, p), we determine (precisely) its energy, E =
p2/2m + V (q). If the potential V (q) is a computable function, e.g., a polynomial with
rational coefficients, the energy-value can be computed algorithmically.
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representation of the sequence of results of measurement, then the output
sequences of quantum measurements must have high Kolmogorov complexity
and quantum measurements can be used for creation of random numbers (in
the sense of Kolmogorov’s complexity approach).7 This reasoning provides,
in fact, the foundational (philosophical) basis for the project on quantum
random generators [49].
In the light of the previous consideration it seems that justification of
proper functioning of quantum random generators can be done only from
physical principles. Surprisingly mathematics still plays a crucial role, since
it is heavily exploited in so-called no-go theorems saying that it is impossible
to introduce hidden variables, parameters which provide a finer description of
the state of a quantum system than given by its quantum state. Violation of
the principle of sufficient cause is incompatible with existence of subquantum
models with hidden variables. Roughly speaking, one cannot start selling
quantum random generators before a loophole free test rejecting existence of
hidden variables is successfully performed.8
Von Neumann understood very well the role of no-go theorems in justifi-
cation of his thesis about violation of causality by quantum systems and he
formulated and presented [56] a sketch of proof of the first no-go theorem,
nowadays known as the von Neumann theorem. However, his theorem was
criticized, e.g., by Bell [5], [7] and Ballentine [3], [4] as based on unphysical
assumptions about the rules for coupling an imaginable classical hidden vari-
able model of quantum phenomena and the genuine quantum model. This
theorem is considered as having no physical impact.
Now the most widely discussed no-go theorem is due to Bell [7]. However,
as well as the von Neumann theorem, it is based on concrete rules coupling
imaginable classical hidden variable model and the genuine quantum model
[30]. Adequateness of these rules to real physical situations also can be
criticized [17], [?], [29], [30], [39], [40], [27], [28], [18], [45], [47]. This is,
in fact, the main problem of all no-go theorems [30] as attempts to reject
all possibly imaginable models with hidden variables and imaginable rules
coupling them with the quantum model. Even Bell pointed out [6] “that
7We remark that surprisingly nobody tried to estimate Kolmogorov complexity for
outputs of quantum measurements, e.g., for Bell’s test. We remark that, although the
Kolmogorov measure of complexity is incomputable, it can be effectively estimated. Es-
timation of complexity of outputs of quantum measurements is an exciting project which
may clarify a lot in interrelation of classical and quantum randomness.
8Recently experimenters performed a few tests, e.g., [26], [25], [51] which claim to
be loophole free. However, it is too early to declare that the problem of loopholes was
completely solved. The experimental data should pass independent statistical analysis, cf.
[64], [33].
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what is proved, by impossibility proofs, is lack of imagination.” (We emphasize
that the presented consideration does not question the recent experimental
success in performing the final loophole free experiment [26], [25], [51].)
Let us assume that Bell’s theorem really can be considered as describing
physically reasonable coupling between the most general model with hidden
variables and QM (as the majority of the quantum community believes).
There is still one fundamental problem preventing justification of von Neu-
mann’s statement about violation of the principle of sufficient cause. Bell’s
theorem rejects only local hidden variable models, i.e., models preventing
faster than light communications. Thus von Neumann was right and the
quantum random generators really produce random sequences (at least in
the framework of Kolmogorov’s algorithmic complexity) only if nature were
not too exotic, i.e., superluminal communications were impossible.
As we know (sectionrandomness), the Kolmogorov and Martin-Lo¨f ap-
proaches to randomness lead to the same class of random sequences. There-
fore one can proceed formally and say that above reasoning that quantum
randomness implies Kolmogorov’s randomness also leads to the implication:
quantum randomness7→ Martin-Lo¨f randomness. Thus a sequence produced
by a quantum random generator has to pass the universal Martin-Lo¨f test
and, in particular, any finite block of algorithmic tests, e.g., the NIST test.
Such type of reasoning is very popular in the community working with quan-
tum random generators. It seems that one needs not to check whether the
output of a quantum random generator would pass, e.g., the NIST test.
There is an objection to such a viewpoint. It is based on recognition that
each quantum experiment depends on numerous “technicalities” modifying
the output. That is, the actual output may essentially differ from output
expected from the theoretical analysis of the experimental design. Thus, in
any event, the NIST test is needed to certify a quantum random generator.
Now we turn to the notion of randomness as unpredictability, a la von
Mises. We repeat that von Mises’ principle of randomness can be treated
as the law of excluded gambling strategy. However, such a strategy definitely
does not exist if the principle of sufficient cause is violated. Hence, under
the latter assumption outputs of quantum measurements can be considered
as random, from the von Mises viewpoint, i.e., as unpredictable.
We point out that violation of the principle of sufficient cause is state
dependent. If the state ψ of a system is one of the eigenstates of the opera-
tor A representing a quantum observable, then we can predict the result of
measurement with probability one. Thus this principle has to be used with
caution.
All previous considerations were devoted to matching of the notion of
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quantum randomness to the standard notions elaborated in mathematics.
As we have seen, by assuming that a sequence is produced by a quantum
source of randomness one can be sure that it is random in the classical sense.
Thus to be random in the classical sense is a necessary condition of quantum
randomness. Is it sufficient? The canonical answer is “no”. It is typically
claimed that only quantum randomness is genuine randomness.
6 Lawless Universe? Digital Philosophy?
Where did complexity of the Universe come from? This is one of the most
fundamental problems of modern science. One of the first scientists who
took this problem seriously was Leibniz, see Chaitin [14] for the excellent
presentation of Leibniz’s views on this problem. 9 And to explain the origin
of Universe’s complexity Leibniz “simply” appealed to God.
Leibniz was interested in distinguishing lawful and lawless experimental
data. He presented a beautiful example illustrating this problem. He pro-
posed us to scatter points at random on a sheet of paper, closing the eyes
and stabbing at the paper with a pen many times, say a few hundreds. The
output will be a randomly looking pattern on the sheet. However, Leibniz
pointed out that even for this data one can easy find a mathematical law,
in fact, a polynomial curve, that passes through all these randomly chosen
points. To show this he used the concrete application of Lagrangian interpo-
lation procedure.
For reader’s convenience, we recall that the Lagrange interpolating poly-
nomial is the polynomial P (x) of degree ≤ (n− 1) that passes through the n
points (x1, y1 = f(x1)), (x2, y2 = f(x2)), ..., (xn, yn = f(xn)), and is given by
P (x) =
(x− x2)(x− x3)...(x− xn)
(x1 − x2)(x1 − x3)...(x1 − xn)
y1+ (11)
(x− x1)(x− x3)...(x− xn)
(x2 − x1)(x2 − x3)...(x2 − xn)
y2 + ...
+
(x− x1)(x− x2)...(x− x(n− 1))
(xn − x1)(xn − x2)...(xn − xn−1)
yn.
Thus, in spite of the fact that the generation of the aforementioned pat-
tern satisfies the heuristic criteria of randomness as unpredictability, we can-
not say that the output pattern is lawless. It seems that Leibniz was the
9This book is the apotheosis of the algorithmic approach, not only to randomness
and complexity, but to science in general. (Of course, it is surprising that in this book
Kolmogorov was not mentioned at all!)
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first who framed the problem of distinguishing lawfulness and lawlessness
correctly: not as distinguishing between lawful and totally lawless processes,
but between processes having different degree of complexity. We see that the
complexity of the mathematical law (11) rapidly increases with the increase
of the size of the pattern. This Leibniz reasoning was the first step towards
the modern theory of complexity and randomness. Following Leibniz, we can
say that the basic task of a scientist is not just to find mathematical laws
describing natural (or mental) phenomena, but the simple laws, laws of low
complexity, which at the same time produce sufficiently rich patterns of data
(to be of some interest for scientists). Again from the above toy example,
one can see that the “majority of mathematical laws” are complex, the ap-
pearance of a simple law with rich output is merely an exception. And, for
Leibniz, such exceptionally simple and fruitful laws could appear only in ac-
cordance with God’s plan: “God has chosen that which is the most perfect, that
is to say, in which at the same time the hypotheses are as simple as possible, and
phenomena are as rich as possible.” Here Leibniz was cited again by following
Chaitin [14] who used this citation for the following passage:
“The complexity of the Universe is combined from the complexity of laws for
expressing of natural phenomena and the complexity of initial and boundary condi-
tions. If initially the Universe was described by simple initial-boundary conditions
(as by the Big Bang scenario), then the complexity of the Universe is due to com-
plexity of laws for expression of natural phenomena. Thus the complexity of the
Universe can be identified with complexity of its laws and the latter has to be
measured as the algorithmic complexity”.
However this way of thinking cannot explain where this complexity of laws
came from. Although Leibniz’s views are very sympathetic for Chaitin, he is
not consistent enough to appeal to God. Instead of such an appeal to God’s
plan of creation of the perfect world, he referred to quantum randomness as
generating patterns which cannot be described by simple laws. However, in
the purely classical considerations his reference to quantum is really illogical.
How can one refer to quantum randomness if the usual classical coin tossing
generates a pattern which is algorithmically so complex as a pattern produced
by a quantum random generator? We cite book [14] again, p. 119:
“This idea of an infinite series of independent tosses of a fair coin may sound
like a simple idea, a toy physical model, but it is a serious challenge, indeed a
horrible nightmare, for any attempt to formulate a rational world view! Because
each outcome is in fact that is true for no reason, that is true only by accident!”
Chaitin can be really considered as one of the fathers of digital philosophy
which, in particular, led to digital physics culminating in Wheeler’s statement
[63]:
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“It from bit. Otherwise put, every ’it’ every particle, every field of force, even
the space-time continuum itself derives its function, its meaning, its very existence
entirely - even if in some contexts indirectly from the apparatus-elicited answers
to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. ’It from bit’ symbolizes the idea that
every item of the physical world has at bottom - a very deep bottom, in most
instances - an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises
in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of
equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-
theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe.”
In this paper we are mainly interested in quantum theoretical version
of informational physics, as Zeilinger-Brukner informational interpretation
[65], [9]- [12], [66] (see also Kofler and Zeilinger [34]) and QBism of Fuchs
et al. [15], [?], [22]- [24]. These approaches, while being a part of informa-
tion physics, do not match the digital philosophy precisely. Here (in QM)
information is considered as a primary physical quantity which cannot be
defined in terms of other more fundamental variables. Opposite to Chaitin
and Wheeler, they (Zeilinger et al. and Fuchs et al.) put the transcendental
content in the notion of information which matches perfectly with the tran-
scendental content of a quantum state. For them information need not be
produced algorithmically. Opposite to Chaitin, they are not afraid to use real
and complex numbers. It seems that complex numbers really represent the
physical content of phenomena. (I am not completely sure, but it seems that
QM would not work with algorithmically computable complex amplitudes.)
We also mention the information viewpoint on Bohmian mechanics based
on the active information interpretation of the quantum potential. This in-
terpretation was elaborated by Bohm and Hiley [8]. It is amazing that even
an ontological model of quantum phenomena, Bohmian mechanics, naturally
generates the purely information interpretation of its basic entity, the quan-
tum potential.10
7 Unpredictability and Indeterminism
Unpredictability is very often coupled with indeterminism. The latter is the
impossibility to describe generation of data by a dynamical map:
y = U(x0), (12)
10The active information interpretation opened the door for applications of the formal-
ism of Bohmian mechanics outside physics, in particular, in mathematical modeling of
quantum-like cognition [8], later this formalism was explored in behavioral finances [29],
[32].
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where U is a map from the input x0 to the output x.
In the simplified picture of random processes determinism implies pre-
dictability, so no randomness. To be unpredictable a process has to be inde-
terministic. However, this picture does not match the real situation.
Consider the basic example of a collective, Mises random sequence: an
infinite series of independent tosses of a fair coin. It is also random from the
viewpoint of Kolmogorov, i.e., in the framework of algorithmic complexity.
Hence, it is Martin-Lo¨f random. However, a coin is a classical mechanical
system, and its motion is described by Newtonian mechanics, [61], [19], [46],
[54]. Hence, one can construct the corresponding dynamical map (12). Thus
if we know the initial condition, we can predict the outcome of a coin toss.
The process of generation of this (Mises-Kolmogorov-Martin-Lo¨f) random
sequence is totally deterministic. Its unpredictability is just a matter of im-
precision in determination of initial conditions. Nowadays this trade between
(un)predictability and (im)precision in determination of x0 can be numeri-
cally modeled [54]. The latter paper contains a detailed mechanical model
of the coin tossing dynamics. The results of the corresponding numerical
simulation were presented graphically. It was shown that if the impreci-
sion in selection of x0 is less than ǫ, where ǫ depends on parameters of the
model (see [54] for details), then one can predict the outcome of each coin
toss. However, if one can determine x0 with accuracy only up to a ball of
some radius larger than this ǫ, then the outcome cannot be determined in
advance. Thus the story about coin tossing is a story about the precision of
determination of initial conditions. Since this is one of the basic examples of
the Mises-Kolmogorov-Martin-Lo¨f random sequences, we conclude that the
modern mathematical theory of randomness does not contradict determinism
in sequence generation. That is why Chaitin [14] has to refer to quantum
randomness to emphasize the lawlessness dimension of randomness. To be
more precise, we have to speak about the complexity dimension. However,
the example of coin tossing shows that there is nothing about complexity
of physical laws. The dynamical equations [54] are simple Newtonian equa-
tions. At the same time Kolmogorov complexity of the output is very high.
What does this mean? Simply that Kolmogorov complexity is not an ade-
quate measure of complexity of physical laws behind generation of sequences
of outputs.
What is the main problem in matching the Kolmogorov approach and
physics? This is consideration of solely algorithmically representable laws.
The algorithmic-computability approach well serves the purposes of computer
science and artificial intelligence, but not physics. All basic physical models
contain some transcendental element. For example, Newtonian mechanics is
based on real numbers. We remind a few measure-theoretic facts about reals.
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• Consider the segment [0, 1] and probability pL given by the linear
Lebesgue measure; here pL([a, b]) = b − a. Then probability that a
randomly selected number from [0, 1] is rational equals to zero, the
same is valid for algebraic numbers (solutions of algebraic equations).
Thus probability to get a transcendental number is one.
• One can introduce the notion of a computable real number. Real num-
bers with probability one are noncomputable.
The classical model of natural phenomena is fundamentally noncom-
putable. The main problem of digital philosophy and digital physics is that
they try to identify the human brain with computer. The latter definitely
can operate only with computable quantities, but the former can easily make
transcendental steps in reasoning, see R. Penrose [48] for detailed presenta-
tion of this viewpoint.
Therefore the following statement of Chaitin, “the manifest of computabil-
ity”, is not about science done by humans, but science done by computers or
other artificial intellectual systems, so see [14], p. 64:
“I think of a scientific theory as a binary computer program for calculating the
observations, which are also written in binary. And you have a law of nature if
there is compression, if the experimental data is compressed in a computer program
that has a smaller number of bits than are in the data that it explains. ...
But if the experimental data cannot be compressed, if the smallest program
for calculating it is just as large as it is ..., then the data is lawless, unstructured,
patternless, not amenable to scientific study, incompressible. In a word, random,
irreducible!”
Now we turn to quantum randomness. As was pointed out, the math-
ematical theory of randomness cannot distinguish “classical and quantum
randomness”, random sequences generated by coin tossing and by quantum
random generators. They are equally algorithmically complex (Kolmogorov)
and typical (Martin-Lo¨f).11 How can one try to formalize the notion of
quantum random sequence? Combing the viewpoints of von Neumann and
Kolmogorov-Martin-Lo¨f (and Church, Solomonoff, Chaitin, Schnorr), we can
say that this is a Kolmogorov-Martin-Lo¨f random sequence such that it is
impossible to present a causal model of its generation. (A larger class of
quantum randomness one gets by considering a deterministic dynamical sys-
tem, instead of a general causal model.)
However, it seems to be impossible to prove the impossibility of causal
generation for a concrete sequence. In spite of huge activity in generation
11 We remind that “a good theory of randomness as unpredictability”, a la von Mises,
has not been yet created. Its development culminated in Wald’s theorem, section ??. The
next step, to the Church-Wald collectives, might be a step in wrong direction.
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of various no-go theorems, we still do not have an adequate no-go theorem
for one output experiment with quantum systems. The famous Bell theorem
is about impossibility of combination of a few causally generated outputs
(if we ignore the issue of nonlocality).12 This theorem cannot exclude the
possibility that each of them can be causally generated. It even cannot
exclude the possibility of deterministic generation of all these outputs. An
adequate no-go theorem might be the original von Neumann theorem [56], see
also section 5. However, nowadays it is commonly considered as inadequate
to the real quantum mechanical situation.
Finally, we remark that one has to distinguish quantum randomness and
quantum probability. It seems that these notions are often identified (may
be unconsciously). Then the nonclassical structure of quantum probability
is treated as the argument in favor of nonclassicality of quantum random-
ness. For example, we can point to intensive studies justifying peculiarities
of quantum randomness as compared to classical randomness by using the
Bell no-go theorem [49]. Here nonclassical probability structure of the Bell
test is treated as leading to generation of nonclassically random sequences.
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